Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty

Part I. Clarification, Illustration, and Defense of the Confirmation/Evidence Distinction

1. Introductory Remarks—Inferential Uncertainty
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

2. Bayesian and Evidential Paradigms
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

3. Confirmation and Evidence Distinguished
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

4. Initial Difficulties Dispelled
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

Part II. Comparisons with Other Philosophical Accounts of Evidence

5. A Subjective Bayesian Surrogate for Evidence
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

6. Error-Statistics, Evidence, and Severity
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

7. Selective Confirmation, Bootstrapping, and Theoretical Constants
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

8. Veridical and Misleading Evidence
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

Part III. Applications of the Confirmation/Evidence Distinction to Epistemological Puzzles

9. The Paradoxes of Confirmation
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

10. Descartes’ Argument from Dreaming and the Problem of Underdetermination
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

11. Concluding Reflections
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper

Nyckelord: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Statistical Theory and Methods, Logic