The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism

Part I. Introductory Chapters

1. The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences
Nikolay Milkov

2. The Berlin Group and the USA: A Narrative of Personal Interactions
Nicholas Rescher

Part II. Historical–Theoretical Context

3. J. F. Fries’ Philosophy of Science, the New Friesian School and the Berlin Group: On Divergent Scientific Philosophies, Difficult Relations and Missed Opportunities
Helmut Pulte

4. Ernst Cassirer, Kurt Lewin, and Hans Reichenbach
Jeremy Heis

Part III. Hans Reichenbach

5. Genidentity and Topology of Time: Kurt Lewin and Hans Reichenbach
Flavia Padovani

6. Did Reichenbach Anticipate Quantum Mechanical Indeterminism?
Michael Stöltzner

7. Everybody Has the Right to Do What He Wants: Hans Reichenbach’s Volitionism and Its Historical Roots
Andreas Kamlah

Part IV. Walter Dubislav

8. Dubislav and Classical Monadic Quantificational Logic
Christian Thiel

9. “Demonstrations”, Not “Deductions”: Walter Dubislav on Transcendental Arguments
Temilo Zantwijk

10. Dubislav and Bolzano
Anita Kasabova

Part V. Kurt Grelling

11. The Third Man: Kurt Grelling and the Berlin Group
Volker Peckhaus

12. Gestalt, Equivalency, and Functional Dependency: Kurt Grelling’s Formal Ontology
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski

Part VI. Paul Oppenheim and Carl Hempel

13. Paul Oppenheim on Order—The Career of a Logico-Philosophical Concept
Paul Ziche, Thomas Müller

14. Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher?
Nikolay Milkov

15. Hempel, Carnap, and the Covering Law Model
Erich H. Reck

Avainsanat: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science