Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

1. Introduction
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

2. Voting Paradoxes
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

3. Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

4. The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

5. The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

6. The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

7. Summary
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi

Keywords: Economics, Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice, Electoral Politics, Political Philosophy, Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Democracy